Judgments

By empowering the legislature to determine in which cases and in what form criminal prosecution is possible, Article 12.2 of the Constitution guarantees to all citizens that their actions will only be punishable under rules adopted by a democratically elected deliberative assembly.Furthermore, the principle of legality in criminal matters proceeds from the concept that criminal law must be framed in terms allowing everyone to know, at the time of taking an action, whether or not it is punishable. It requires the legislature to specify, in terms that are sufficiently clear and precise and offer legal certainty, which acts will attract a sanction, so as to ensure, on the one hand, that the person taking an action is able to make a satisfactory prior assessment of the criminal consequences of that action, and on the other, that the courts are not given too much discretion.However, the principle of legality in criminal matters does not preclude the law from conferring a power of discretion on the courts. Account needs to be taken of the general character of laws, the variety of situations to which they apply and the changing nature of the actions they are intended to punish.Dress requirements may vary in time and place. However, some mandatory limits may be imposed on them in public spaces. No type of conduct may be permitted for the sole reason that it is justified on religious grounds. Freedom of expression and freedom of religion are not absolute. Provided it does not take the form of an act aimed at the destruction of recognised rights or freedoms, even the rejection of the fundamental values of our democratic society may be expressed, but the manner of expressing it is subject to restrictions. It is left to the discretion of the legislature to determine the restrictions to those freedoms which may be deemed necessary in the democratic society in which it operates.

A system for the adoption or ratification of building or environmental permits by a parliamentary assembly is consistent with the Constitution, taken together with the applicable rules of international law (Aarhus Convention and Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985), only to the extent that it provides either for a substantive examination by the parliamentarians based on adequate information concerning the project submitted (in which case the system is not covered by the Convention or the Directive) or for judicial review both of the basic conditions governing these permits and the procedure prior to their adoption (where the authorisation system is covered by the Convention or the Directive).When conducting a review in the light of the Convention taken together with provisions of European law, the Court may, if appropriate, ask the Court of Justice of the European Union for a preliminary ruling on questions relating to the interpretation of those provisions.

Interference with children's rights to have their best interest taken into account cannot be justified by the aim of prohibiting incestuous relations between persons related by blood. It is no doubt legitimate that lawmakers should seek to prevent such relations for reasons that have to do both with protecting the family and individuals and with protecting society.Unlike the bar on marriage, however, the absolute ban on establishing descent from both parents for any children born of such a union is not an appropriate means of achieving these objectives. For by making it impossible under any circumstances for the child to claim descent from both parents, Article 325 of the Civil Code cannot help to prevent a situation that, by definition, has already come about.

Even though the right to adopt does not appear as such among the rights guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights, the legal arrangements governing the family ties that exist de facto above and beyond any biological reality concern private life.The child's potential interest in being able to claim legal descent from both parents generally prevails over the right of the mother to refuse consent for adoption by the woman to whom she had been married, with whom she had entered into a co-parenthood arrangement before the child was born and who had carried on with this arrangement after the birth, under an adoption procedure.

The right of access to a court, which must be secured to everyone as a general legal principle, can be subject to limitations, including ones of a financial nature, in this case a registration fee, provided such limitations do not impair the very essence of the right of access to a court.Delegation by the legislature to the executive does not violate the principle of lawfulness in fiscal matters, provided the powers of that authority are defined with sufficient clarity and concern the execution of measures, the essential features of which have previously been defined by law.Except in criminal law, there is no general legal principle guaranteeing a right of appeal.The fundamental right of access to a court does not include the right to use existing procedures for manifestly vexatious purposes. A fine for manifestly vexatious applications is not incompatible with this fundamental right, provided this notion is interpreted narrowly.The need to speed up and simplify the proceedings in cases concerning aliens may justify waiving the requirement to hold a hearing and file pleadings in all cases. However, doing away with the right of applicants in annulment proceedings to file observations in reply, having studied the administrative file and the arguments advanced by the other party in its submissions, amounts to a disproportionate interference with the applicants' right of defence.The Court may extend the effect of a repealed provision in the interest of legal certainty and to allow lawmakers to adopt new arrangements by such date as it may determine.

Every voter or candidate has the necessary interest to request the Court to annul provisions that might adversely affect his or her vote or candidacy.A regulation prohibiting three quarters of the members of the Walloon Parliament from combining membership of this parliament with membership of a municipal (executive) college of the Region in question is not contrary to the rules on the division of powers in federal Belgium or to the principle of equality and non-discrimination (Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution), possibly in conjunction with Article 3 Protocol 1 ECHR.

Treating two categories of young people brought before the youth court differently depending on their age at the time they committed an act classified as an offence is contrary to the rules on equality and non-discrimination.

The principle of equality in the educational field (Article  24.4 of the Constitution) does not preclude differences between the official and the free education systems concerning the status of staff, and more precisely the manner in which a temporary appointment can be terminated.

It is discriminatory and therefore contrary to Articles  10 and 11 of the Constitution to require train owners (in the instant case the Société nationale des chemins de fer belges) to compensate for damage in the event of accidents, even where a pedestrian has been injured, at a place which is completely isolated from traffic, whereas under the terms of the Law of 21 November 1989 on compulsory insurance for responsibility in matters of automobile vehicles, the insurers of the owners of other automobile vehicles are only required to provide compensation if a traffic accident occurs on the public highway.

The wording of Article 2.3 of the Special Law of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court shows that the intention was to limit the ability of members of legislative assemblies to take legal action by reserving locus standi for their presidents, imposing the condition that two thirds of the members must request the action. Therefore, an individual parliamentarian lacks the requisite interest in requesting annulment of a legal provision delegating specific competences to the Crown.The Court may discontinue examination of manifestly inadmissible appeals under summary procedure in a restricted Chamber of three judges.

No consideration can justify, in terms of the goals of public health and the interests of patients, the fact that a patient seeking to have a prescription dispensed can prevail on a person authorised to dispense medicines to the public for the purpose of importing a medicine which has not received approval for marketing or registration in Belgium, but cannot prevail on that person to import a medicine whose marketing in Belgium has been approved but which is not yet marketed in Belgium.

Assignment of a family name is mainly based on considerations of social necessity. Unlike the assign-ment of a forename, it is determined by law, which is geared firstly to determining the family name in a simple, standard manner, and secondly to attributing some degree of permanence to such family name.Unlike the right to bear a name, the right to give one’s family name to one’s child cannot be considered a fundamental right. In regulating name assignment, therefore, the legislature has extensive discretionary powers.

When verifying the legislator’s compliance with the principle of equality and non-discrimination and with Article 13 of the Constitution, the Court should also take into account the rights secured to litigants by Article 6.1 ECHR.The right of access to a court constitutes an element inherent in the right to a fair trial. Albeit fundamental in a law-based state, this right is not absolute.

Recognised stateless persons and recognised refugees are in substantially comparable situations, having regard not only to the provisions of the New York Convention of 28 September 1954 relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 relating to the Status of Refugees, but also to the fact that by granting them recognition as stateless or refugee as the case may be, the authority acknowledges duties towards those concerned.When it is established that a stateless person has been granted this status because of involuntary loss of nationality and proven inability to obtain a legal long-term residence permit in another State with which he may have ties, the situation in which he is placed is such as to cause discriminatory interference with his fundamental rights. Consequently, the difference in treatment between a stateless person in such a situation in Belgian territory and a recognised refugee has no reasonable justification.